The blue donkey has been the stalwart of American liberalism since the post-Civil War party realignment. But, like any half of a two-party duopoly, the Democratic Party has been stretched thin by the broad range of voter ideologies it must cater to. With 2028 fast approaching, this tension has only intensified, raising the risk of repeating the party’s historical missteps.
How is a national organization supposed to placate the political whims of both a Kentucky blue-collar union worker, whose family has voted Democratic for generations but is now ready to jump ship for the GOP, and a Brooklyn socialist, who didn’t vote for Kamala Harris over concerns about U.S. policy in the Middle East?
This issue of striving for mass appeal while simultaneously covering too much ideological ground comes at the worst possible time for the Democrats. There has been essentially no organized resistance from the party to the Trump administration’s encroachment on civil liberties. What good is an opposition party if it can’t decide how to oppose?
The Democrats’ current identity crisis is not without precedent. For example, the 2028 presidential field bears striking similarities to the Democratic primary of 1972. Both elections follow a Republican administration, and, if the war in Gaza ensues, each election will have an electoral playing field marred by concerns over U.S. foreign policy.
During Richard Nixon’s first term from 1969 to 1973, the U.S.-led war in Vietnam raged on as public opinion on the war gradually shifted to a point where continued fighting became very unpopular. The increase in public pushback to U.S. involvement in Vietnam set up the 1972 Democratic primary to be a heated contest over which direction the party should be headed on both Vietnam and domestic discontent, one of which being a small recession in 1969-1970. These pressures mirror the current economic uncertainty post-COVID, with high inflation and market volatility triggered by global conflict and Trump-era trade policies.
Echoing the diverse viewpoints that push and pull at the center of the Democratic Party today, the ‘72 primary fielded a wide range of candidates with varying viewpoints. The frontrunner, Senator Ed Muskie of Maine, was opposed to the war but not as passionately as his chief opponent, Senator George McGovern of South Dakota. The former’s campaign was eventually derailed by his disproportionate response to a bizarre scandal involving a newspaper in New Hampshire, and after Muskie’s exit, McGovern began to run on an increasingly vocal anti-war platform. Just as is anticipated for 2028, there was also a slew of other candidates from all over the political spectrum entering the primary: the 1968 nominee Hubert Humphrey, Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm of New York, and the segregationist George Wallace, just to name a few.
McGovern was eventually nominated after a long and bitter primary, and he ended up losing to Nixon in one of the worst landslides in U.S. electoral history, only winning 17 electoral votes. Though Watergate would later bring Nixon down, the Democrats’ disarray and lack of coherent messaging doomed them in 1972. If today’s Democrats were to look at any election for a lesson, this is it—they must do the opposite of what their party did 53 years ago.
At the moment, the Democrats are vulnerable. Amid political instability, economic turmoil, and a Republican trifecta in the federal government, a second Trump administration appears bent on dismantling or significantly weakening many of the institutions that shape the core of the federal government and republic. The moment is even more significant as Trump supporters begin to reconsider their vote, only to find themselves stranded between parties with no clear banner under which to rally.
By failing to establish a centralized and effective resistance strategy, Democrats cede power to the Republican party, placing themselves in a powerless position. Political trifectas like these are rare, the last of which occurred during Trump’s first term before Democrats regained control of the House in 2018. However, the consequences of that vulnerability are still playing out and will affect the political climate in 2028.
It’s unlikely the Democrats’ ideological tensions will be resolved by the 2028 presidential race. While anti-Trump sentiment has been a significant tool for Democrats, it won’t be enough to secure the party’s future. A strong contender is needed to weather the uncertainty of the next presidential election, especially at a time when there is no clear frontrunner.
