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Why the US and Iran Keep Warning Each Other Before Strikes

August 23, 2025

Tropical islands, sports analogies and bunker busting munitions rarely belong in the same story. Yet in the enduring rivalry between the U.S. and Iran, they expose a strange pattern: two adversaries that routinely give each other advance notice before attacking. For decades Washington and Tehran have been locked in a cautious dance repeatedly pulling back from outright war. The latest strikes on Iranian nuclear plants suggest the redlines are shifting but they also follow a familiar choreography where each blow is announced well before it lands. 

In January 2020, Iran responded to the assassination of Qasem Soleimani by firing over a dozen rockets at the American Al-Asad airbase in Iraq. Soleimani, widely regarded as the second most powerful figure in Iran, had been killed days earlier in an American drone strike. Tehran’s response was swift and expressive. Ali Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader, wept while leading Soleimani’s funeral. Footage shows Tehran’s streets packed with mourners, fifty six of whom were crushed at his burial. Meanwhile within parliament, lawmakers chanted “Death to America”. 

But when the dust cleared at Al-Asad, something didn’t add up. Despite Iran’s ferocious rhetoric, their missile strikes did not inflict any casualties. In fact, the Americans at Al-Asad had hours to evacuate non-essential staff and seek shelter. Curiously, it was Iran who had tipped them off. 

This pattern was repeated just a few weeks ago. After American bombers and warships attacked fortified nuclear facilities in Iran, Tehran sent word that they intended to retaliate by attacking the American Al-Udeid air base in Qatar.

It is unclear exactly how that warning was received exactly. Qatari officials denied receiving any prior notice regarding Al-Udeid, even as they closed their airspace ahead of the attack. Meanwhile, the New York Times reported that both Doha and Washington were directly warned by Iran. Regardless, hours after the attacks, President Trump publicly commended Iran “… for giving us early notice which made it possible for no lives to be lost and nobody to be injured.”

Even if they hadn’t explicitly notified anyone, there were other indications that Iran intended to attack Al-Udeid. In hockey and boxing there’s a concept called “telegraphing.” It’s when an athlete gives away their next move before making it, like turning one’s body before a jab or lowering a shoulder before slamming an opponent into the boards. Usually this is a mistake, but sometimes it’s useful to be predictable. The U.S. and Iran have both been increasingly operating under this logic. 

For example, hours before the Al-Udeid attack the Telegraph (the British conservative newspaper) reported that Iran was repositioning missile launchers towards U.S. forces. If the Telegraph had time to report on this development, the United States military certainly had the opportunity to act on it. Washington plays this game too. In April, its air force deployed six B-2 stealth bombers at Diego Garcia, a joint U.S-UK military base on a stunning tropical island in the Indian Ocean. Then, analysts quickly framed the move as a part of a broader deterrence strategy; CNN, for example, chalked it up as “a massive show of force to Houthis, Iran.” 

However, in late June the exact same type of bomber carried out strikes against the Iranian Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan nuclear facilities with GBU-57 bombs. These attacks ultimately precipitated the Al-Udeid air base attack. 

In retrospect, Tehran likely understood what the bombers’ deployment to Diego Garcia meant. While the bombers were being deployed, the Trump administration was pressing for a new nuclear deal. Meanwhile, the B-2 is the only aircraft capable of carrying the GBU-57 “bunker buster” bombs specifically designed to penetrate heavily fortified structures like Iranian nuclear sites. In other words, the U.S. was telegraphing the strikes on those facilities months earlier. 

This marks a substantial shift in strategy. Historically, the U.S.-Iran relationship has been defined by ambiguity. The recent pattern of telegraphing suggests a new approach where public signaling is given more importance. This should not be mistaken for collaboration; rather both sides increasingly understand the cost of miscalculation and are shifting to managing escalation in performative and carefully broadcast ways. 

This pattern of behavior is remarkable for two nations that haven’t held formal diplomatic relations since 1980. The last American Embassy in Iran was overrun by students during the 1979 revolution that ultimately overthrew the U.S. backed Shah. Over fifty Americans were held hostage for 444 days marking the end of all U.S. diplomatic presence in Iran. 

Still, there have been moments of tentative engagement. The Obama era Iran nuclear deal even featured direct or “face to face” negotiations representing a substantial thawing in relations. However, since the first Trump administration backed out of the deal in 2018, Iran has refused to meet directly with their American counterparts. Instead, what passes as U.S. – Iran diplomacy relies on intermediaries with figures like the Omani foreign minister shuttling messages between diplomats housed in separate rooms. 

Paradoxically, while formal diplomacy has remained largely frozen over the past forty years (outside of the Obama era detente), Iran and the U.S. have become increasingly blunt with their intentions and actions. 

Why is this the case? Some onlookers point towards a deliberate choreography at work. Former UN weapons inspector, and now frequent commentator on Russian state media, Scott Ritter has gone so far as characterizing the recent strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities as a “grand act of theatre.”According to Ritter who appeared on the controversial Beirut based Al Mayadeen TV channel, Trump’s strikes were designed to save face after partaking in Israel’s surprise attack which in Ritter’s view, “failed to accomplish its mission.”

Whether or not Ritter’s reading is accepted totally, the idea of performative signaling does point toward the recurring pattern of telegraphed actions and advance notices. When both sides appear more invested in managing perceptions than in achieving decisive strategic outcomes, escalation remains carefully contained, reinforcing the choreography of restraint that has come to define their interactions.

There are other theories that operate under this assumption: that U.S. Iran relations are defined by performative military actions that never seem to push the needle one way or another. 

According to Paulo Aguiar, an analyst writing for the Geopolitical Monitor, Israel might provide the missing piece that explains the U.S. and Iran’s peculiar performance. Aguiar asserts that while the U.S. is primarily concerned about Iran’s nuclear capabilities, “America’s greatest ally in the middle east” has different priorities. 

To Aguiar, Israel’s posture toward Iran is more maximalist –  treating the Islamic Republic itself as an existential threat, not just its nuclear program. “The nuclear issue,” Aguiar writes, “is not treated as an end in itself but as a flexible tool of justification.” Based on this logic, if the contest is about managing perception, then the introduction of a third actor with its own stakes and norms makes that management far more difficult for Washington.

Yet neither Washington nor Tel Aviv are likely to achieve their stated objectives. Historically it is unprecedented for a determined state to be deterred from acquiring nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan, despite immense external pressure, pushed through. North Korea built its arsenal under the harshest sanction regimes in modern history. And in Iran’s case specifically, the Fordow nuclear plant strikes have failed to eliminate its desire to enrich uranium. 

For Israel, the goal of catalyzing regime change in Tehran through force appears equally unlikely. The Iranian state has proven remarkably resilient despite years of sanctions, isolation, and periodic attacks. If anything, external pressure has tended to reinforce, rather than unravel, its internal cohesion.

This brings us back to the choreography. U.S. and Iran actions have fallen into a rhythm: signaling enough to be noticed while avoiding full-scale escalation. Israeli strikes, however, disrupt that pattern, making it harder for either side to contain the conflict within predictable bounds. In a landscape where the U.S. and Iran telegraph their moves, Israel introduces an element of unpredictability that unsettles the established dynamics.

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John Monaghan

John Monaghan is a senior writer for Vantage.